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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUANE P. RUSSELL and VERLENE RUSSELL, his wife, and
JOHN DALE RUSSELL,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

No.
10929

HOOPER IRRIGATION COMP ANY, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEl\'IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in trespass for compensatory and
punitive damages.
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT
The District Court granted a summary judgment
against the plaintiffs and appellants.
1

RELIEF SOUGII'l' ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal and remand for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants and their predecessors in interest have
for more than 75 years, last past, been owners and
operators in common with others of a lateral from the
Main Hooper Irrigation Company Canal. During the
above period the lateral has been used to carry water to
appellants' land for irrigation purposes.
The Hooper Irrigation Company is a mutual irrigation company engaged in distributing water to its
stockholders. The individual defendants are persons
who were present and participating in the acts of
December 7, 1959 which are described below.
In chronological order is a statement of events
which occurred.
December 7, 1959-Respondents, wilfully, maliciously, wrongfully and without consent of appellants
and without authorization, moved heavy machinery and
equipment on the lateral, filled a large portion of the
lateral with earth and moved and destroyed several
concrete and steel headgates and other water control
facilities in said lateral. ( R. 1 and 14) .
January 15, 1960-Respondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, filed suit (Civil No. 35984) pursuant
to Sections 73-1-6 and 73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated,
2

1953, to condemn appellants' easements, rights of way
and other property rights so that an irrigation ditch
could be expanded and changed.
January 26, 1960-Appellants filed this action
against respondents seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for respondents' actions of December 7, 1959
-filling in the lateral and removing and destroying
headgates and water control facilities. (R. 1).
January 27, 1960-Respondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, obtained an order of occupancy relating
to the property in question in this lawsuit. (R. 3).
April 3, 1963-The condemnation action was tried.
December 15, 1966-Respondent filed a motion
for summary judgment and the court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, included the
record and file in the case of Hooper Irrigation Company vs. Russell, et al, Civil No. 35984, District Court
of Weber County, State of Utah, in the record of the
present case and dismissed appellants' complaint with
prejudice on May 4, 1967. (R. 18). The plaintiffs
appealed.

STATEJ\1ENT OF POINTS
1. It was error to grant a summary judgment where

there are genuine issues of material fact between the
parties.
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2. There are genuine issues of material fact between the appellants and the respondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, which have not been settled.
3. There are genuine issues of material fact be-

tween the appellants and the individual respondents
which have not been settled.

ARGUMENT
I. IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT A SUM-

MARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE ARE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
In determining whether a motion for summary
judgment should be granted, both the statutory and
case law are clear. Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure states that a summary judgment shall
be rendered if "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."
The cases hold that summary judgment is proper
only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See In re Williams Estate,
IO Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683; Dupler vs. Yates, IO
4

Utah 2d. 251, 351 P.2d 624; Brandt vs. Springville
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460.
In construing Rule 56 ( c), the Utah Supreme
Court in Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company, 16
Utah 2d. 30, 395 P.2d 62, stated, "On summary judgment the adverse party is entitled to have the court
survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
. "
hIm.
2. TIIERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS AND THE RESPONDENT, HOOPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY, WHICH HAVE
NOT BEEN SETTLED.
In looking at the record, it is apparent that there
are issues of material fact which are disputed by the
l?arties and which have not been settled by prior litigation.
Appellants in their complaint (R. 1) and the
amendment to the complaint (R. 17) alleged ownership of the lateral and "That on December 7, 1959
the defendants wilfully, maliciously, and wrongfully
and without consent of the plaintiffs", placed heavy
equipment on the lateral, filled a large portion of it
in and removed and destroyed numerous concrete and
steel headgates and other water control facilities in the
lateral.
5

Respondents did not file an answer but in the
affidavit of James M. Johnston, submitted in support
of the motion for summary judgment (R. 7) it is
stated in paragraph 4:
"4. Prior to the securing of the Order of Occupancy on or about February 15, 1960, in the
companion condemnation action between Hooper
Irrigation Company and these plaintiffs, no
equiJ>ment, laborers, or other manner of activity
was commenced, continued or had upon any
of the real properties of the plaintiffs in this
action, or to any improvements located upon said
real properties."
In the Duane P. Russell affidavit (R. 14) appellants state that the allegations of James M. Johnston
quoted above are "not true and that in fact the defendant entered upon the land of the plaintiff without permission from the land owners and without order of
the court and wilfully and maliciously did substantial
damage.''
It is clear that there is an issues of fact as to when
the respondents entered appellants' land and when the
damages occurred as the two affidavits take opposite
positions on this point. There is no other evidence in
the record which could prove the date in question. Thus,
a reasonable inference that respondents entered upon
appellants' land on December 7, 1959, can be drawn
without the necessity of considering the evidence in
the light most favorable to the appellant as Thompson
vs. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d. 30, 395 P.2d 62

permits.
6

The issue of time of entry is material because the
complaint alleges a trespass-the unauthorized entry
upon the realty of another to the damage thereof. The
entry and damage occurred on December 7, 1959 as
alleged in the complaint, (R. l), filed on January 26,
1960. The condemnation suit was filed by respondent,
Hooper Irrigation Company, pursuant to 73-1-6 and
73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and on January
15, 1960 and the order of occupancy was obtained on
January 27, 1960 (R. 3). Thus, without appellants'
consent, respondents had no legal right to enter appellants' property and fill in the lateral and destroy
and remove the headgates on December 7, 1959. As
alleged in the complaint (R. l) no such consent was
given by appellants and since neither the condemnation proceedings had been filed nor an order of occupancy obtained, respondents would be trespassers if
they entered appellants' land on December 7, 1959.
This would give rise to a cause of action in trespass as every trespass gives rise to at least nominal
damages, 87 C.J.S. 1061. Where compensatory damages are proved they may also be recovered and punitive damages can be recovered in addition. The above
damages were alleged in the complaint. (R. l).
It should further be pointed out that the issues
in this case were not settled in the condemnation suit.
In that suit, the only issue submitted to the jury were
as follows:
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1. The value of the construction easement on defendants' land.

2. Damage to the Russells' irrigation easement in
the public street, if any.
3. Loss of value to the Russells' lands severed by
easement, because of project, if any. (R. 7).
Nothing was submitted to the jury as to damages to
such tangible property as concrete and steel headgates
and other water control facilities. These facilities on
the easement were destroyed before the order of occupancy was granted.
Section 73-34-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
states the time at which a right to damages in a condemnation suit accrues:
"For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed
to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be
the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages
to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where such damages are
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section. No improvements put upon the property
subsequent to the date of service of summons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages."
In State Road Commission vs. Woolley, 15 Utah
2d. 248, 390 P.2d 860, it was held:
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"Owner of property condemned is entitled to
the fair market value of that property at time
summons is served, and all factors bearing upon
such value that any prudent purchaser would
take into account at that time should be given
consideration including any potential development in the area reasonably to be expected."
See also Weber Basin Water Conservancy District vs. Ward, IO Utah 2d. 29, 347 P.2d 862.
In the present case the summons was served about
January 15, 1960. At that time the lateral was largely
filled in and the headgates and water control facilities
had been removed and destroyed. Appellants' answer
to respondents' condemnation suit did not contain a
counterclaim for the damage alleged in this suit nor
did it alleges such damage. The jury did not decide
the issues of fact concerning this damage.
Respondents' condemnation suit condemned appellants' property in the condition it was in when the
summons was served and the damages were awarded
on that basis. Respondents' order of occupancy related
to a partially filled in lateral in which the headgates
had been removed and destroyed. Anything occurring
before the summons was served had no bearing upon
the measure of damages in the condemnation suit as
such measure of damages is set as of the time the summons is served.
On December 7, 1959, more than a month before
service of the summons, appellants were the owners
of the lateral, headgates, and water control facilities.
9

They could have moved the headgates or water control
facilities to another place if they so desired. That is,
they were entitled to complete control as to use and
possession of those items until at least the time the
~ummons was served. This control was unlawfully
interfered with by respondents before respondents had
ever filed suit against appellants.
It should also be noted that appellants have pleaded
and asked for an award of punitive damages. Neither
this issue, nor the award of such damages was considered
in the condemnation suit.
3. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES

OF
MATERIAL FACT BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS WHICH HA VE NOT BEEN SETTLED.
The complaint in the present case, Civil No. 36014,
( R. 17) lists the following parties: Duane P. Russell
and Verlene Russell, his wife and John Dale Russell,
plaintiffs, vs. Hooper Irrigation Company, a corporation, Leet Parker, George Fowers, Orson Christensen,
Lyle Parker, Roland Parker, Harold Jackson, Jesse
F. Paraday, Shikazo Y dmushita, George Hunt, C. P.
Higley, Ray Widdison and Sadao Sam Miya, defendants. The complaint further states:
"5. That on December 7, 1959, the defendants,
wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully and without
the consent of the plaintiffs, or any of them,
placed heavy earth-moving machin~ry. and equipment on the said lateral of the plamtiffs, filled a
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large porton of the lateral with earth, and removed and destroyed numerous concrete and
steel headgates and other water-control facilities
in said latera]; all to the damage of the plaintiffs'
in the amount of $5,000.00 actual damages and
$5,000.000 punitive damages."
The complaint in the condemnation case, Civil No.
35984, (R. 3) lists the following parties: Hooper Irrigation Company, plaintiff, vs. Charles Ray Pinkham
and Jessie Pinkham, husband and wife; Effie J. Hooper; John Dale Russell and Frances Russell, husband
and wife; and Duane P. Russell and Verlene Russell,
husband and wife, defendants.
Of all the parties listed, only appellants and respondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, appear in both
the condemnation case and the present case. The rest
of the respondents were not parties to the condemnation suit. Therefore, any issue settled in the condemnation suit would not be binding as between appellants
and those respondents who were not parties to the condemnation suit. It is clear from the portion of the complaint set out above that this action is against all respondents, not merely the corporate respondent, Hooper
Irrigation Company.
Appellants have not had a chance to prove the
wrongful acts and malicious and wilful misconduct of
these respondents in court. Therefore, the summary
judgment must be reversed.
11

CONCLUSION
Material issues of fact are raised in the complaint
and the affidavits. The question of when respondents
entered appellants' property is raised and left unanswered. This question is material because the time
of entry determines the legal rights. This question was
not settled by the condemnation suit because it was
not raised in that suit. The condemnation suit only
considered the property as of the date the summons
was served and the damage complained herein occurred
before the summons was served. Even if the condemnation suit did settle any issues involved in the
present case, it could not bind appellants as to those
respondents who were not parties to the condemnation
suit. For these reasons the summary judgment should
be reversed and a trial of the case on the merits should
be directed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. J. SKEEN
522 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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